Abstract. The paper analyses some general dynamic properties of industries characterized by heterogeneous rms and continuing stochastic entry.
Introduction
This paper analyses the properties and outcomes of competitive dynamics in industries characterized by heterogeneous rms and continuing stochastic entry. In that setting aggregate economic variables { such a s p r i c e s , q u a n tities and indirectly distributive shares { and the structural characteristics of the industry { such as size distributions { are interpreted as stemming from an explicitly dynamic process combining persistent t e c hnological heterogeneity, di erential growth of individual rms and turnover.
The empirical phenomena on industrial dynamics addressed by our model have been examined in several streams of scholarly literature 2 . There is, rst, a substantial body of descriptive w ork based on longitudinal data sets with large numbers of rms and establishments: cf., in particular, the U.S. Census Bureau's Longitudinal Research Database (Audretsch (1997) , Dunne et al. (1988) , Jensen and McGuckin (1997)) , and a broadly similar data set developed at Statistics Canada (Baldwin (1995) ). A great number of speci c questions have been answered by these explorations. What stands out impressionistically, h o wever, is the diversity of rms and the sense of continuing, highly dynamic, disequilibrium. The extent of turnover at the low end of the size distribution is particularly notable. For example, Dunne et al. (1988) summarizing the general picture have remarked among other things that \Entry and exit rates at a point in time are ... highly correlated across industries so that industries with higher than average entry rates tend also to have higher than average exit rates." (p. 496) and that \... the market share of each e n tering cohort generally declines as the cohort ages. This occurs because high exit rates, particularly when the cohort is young, overwhelm any increase in the relative size of the surviving cohort members." (p. 513). Similar properties are emphasized also by Geroski (1995) , who adds among other \stylized results" from the available evidence that a) \entry seems to be slow to react to high pro ts" (p. 427) b) \entry rates are hard to explain using conventional measures of pro tability and entry barriers" (p. 430), and c) \prices are not usually used by incumbents to block e n try" (p. 430).
Second, a g r o wing evidence from the economics of innovation suggests widespread heterogeneity i n t h e t e c hnological capabilities of di erent rms. (For discussions cf. Dosi (1988) and Freeman (1994) ). This evidence intuitively matches that on quite diverse revealed performances by rm and by plant (Jensen and McGuckin (1997) , Doms et al. (1995) ).
Third, in the literature on \industry life cycles" (for overviews, cf. Klepper (1997) and Afuah and Utterback (1997) ), the principal focus is the unfolding pattern of industrial evolution over time. Industries and/or product markets are viewed as entities that have historical starting points, that often have broadly similar patterns of development and ultimately disappear. Levels of entry and exit, degrees of concentration and other phenomena are shown to vary systematically within the historical time-frame of industry development. Moreover, this longitudinal evidence suggests that often (but not always) industrial evolution is punctuated by relatively sudden \shakeouts" which tend to shape the structure of the industry thereafter.
A fourth relevant literature is that of the \population ecology of organizations" (Hannan and Freeman (1989) , Carroll and Hannan (1995) , Carroll (1997) ). Empirical work in the eld is centrally concerned with explaining the variation over time in the number of organizations undertaking a particular type of activity.
In a nutshell, the model that follows is meant to explore some generic properties of processes of industrial evolution whereby { in accordance with empirical \stylized facts" { (i) rms are heterogeneous in their technological capabilities (ii) ent r y a s w ell as exit occurs throughout the history of the industry (iii) one observes wide variations in the rates of growth of rms, both cross-sectionally and over time (iv) turbulence (in terms of market shares and, ultimately, of the identity of incumbent rms) is an equally persistent phenomenon (v) a more or less prolonged \transitory" phase associated with the birth of an industry is often followed by a signi cantly di erent \mature" structure, possibly via a rather sudden endogenously generated shakeout. Moreover, (vi) such dynamic processes generally display s k ewed distributions of rms throughout (see discussions in Ijiri and Simon (1974) , Sutton (1998) , and Dosi et al. (1995) , among many others) and (vii) supply shocks do bear e ect on aggregate prices, which in turn in uence the opportunities of survival and growth of each rm. 3 The model is a \baseline" one in two di erent s e n s e s . In terms of microeconomic foundations, a number of important issues are resolved here by quite simple assumptions. This partly re ects the fact that the paper is in the evolutionary economics tradition, which generally abjures certain kinds of complexity (cf. Nelson and Winter (1982) ). For example, imputation to individual actors of high levels of foresight and knowledge of system structure is avoided when simpler alternatives are adequate to explain aggregate phenomena, and there exists no direct empirical support for the more complex assumptions. This approach stands in sharp contrast to more mainstream economic models of competition among heterogeneous actors which accept full ex ante rationality of the individual actors as a fundamental modeling constraint. In our view, added rationality is added complication, and the model presented here provides a baseline that will permit an assessment of the incremental explanatory gain from such complications. In any case, as we shall show below the major qualitative properties of the model hold also e.g. when one allows more sophisticated responses of potential entrants to perceived incentives.
Second, we do expect, however, that some of the simple assumptions will require elaboration and modi cation in future work if the model is to be brought i n to reasonable correspondence with reality: for some explorations in this spirit, cf. Winter et al. (2000) . Hence, the model is a baseline not merely in the sense of a standard for comparison, but also as a starting point f o r further work. We a n ticipate that many of the results developed here will have at least heuristic value, if not direct application, in such future work.
In particular, in the following we study the properties of that special case of evolutionary dynamics whereby technological heterogeneity is bound from the start to some xed menu of e ciency levels. One may conclude that this model is as \evolutionary" in its spirit as evolutionary games. An obvious extension, straight in the evolutionary spirit, is to allow for an \open-ended" dynamics whereby b o t h e n trants and incumbents continuously learn and discover along the way n o vel techniques 4 . This is indeed what we h a ve begun to do in the mentioned companion paper (Wint e r e t a l . (2000) see also Bottazzi et al. (2001) ) where one studies industry evolution driven by an expanding set of technological opportunities which e n trants progressively tap.
Indeed, we conjecture, the modeling framework presented here might bear fruitful applications well beyond industrial dynamics to a few domains { including some of those currently addressed by e v olutionary games { whereby populations of heterogeneous agents search, adapt and compete in partly unknown environments.
After introducing the spirit of the model with reference to a critical discussion the existing literature (section 2), we present its basic structure (section 3) and consider some important generalizations which can be treated with the same technique and do not a ect the main qualitative conclusions (section 4). Next, we d e v elop in section 5 two dynamic settings, namely a rst one which analyses the dynamics of productive capacity associated with di erent e ciency levels, and a second one which, conversely, follows the fate of all individual rms appearing throughout the whole dynamics path.
Our model entails a stochastic system driven by the persistent random arrival of new rms, on the one hand, and on a systematic selection process linking investments (and ultimately survival) to realized pro tabilities, on the other. Some properties of this system are analyzed in sections 6 and 7, with respect to its \laws of motion" and the time-averages of aggregate statistics such as the productive capacities and the numbers of rms in business associated with di erent e ciency levels.
These analytical results are followed in section 8 by a computer simulation of the model, showing among other things the dynamics in the number, size and age of rms. The Appendix provides mathematical proofs of the main formal propositions of this work. 4 A model in this perspective, albeit explored only with simulation techniques is in Dosi et al. (1995) .
A preliminary view
The idea of the competitive process held here in its essence dates back quite a long time: indeed, it is quite germane to the view of competition retained by classical economists, and, later, in diverse fashions, by Marshall and Schumpeter. Just think for example of the classical view of prices and pro ts as attracted to their \normal" levels by in ows/out ows of investment, or think of the famous Marshallian metaphor of industries as \forests" with young, mature and dying trees. However, the static bias of a lot of contemporary work has also meant the neglect of these early intuitions. This applies to a good extent to traditional industrial economics too. For example, while it is true that in the \Structure-Conduct-Performance" (SCP) paradigm entry and entry barriers play a prominent role, it is equally true that the analysis, if not entirely static is at least ahistorical: dates and sequences of events have no visible importance. 5 Only in recent y ears, a few formal models have tried to address some of the dynamic \stylized facts" recalled above. So, for example, Jovanovic (1982) tries to model industry dynamics whereby heterogeneous agents are initially uncertain about their own e ciencies. As time goes on, the latter are estimated via stochastically independent observations. That work looks for a perfect foresight equilibrium whereby a generic rm adjusts its optimal production plan given its revealed performances at any t (including its optimal exit time). Hence, the model is meant to yield an (equilibrium) path of \noisy selection" whereby a b o ve-average rms expand and below-average ones shrink and eventually die. In a similar spirit, Hopenhayn (1992) attempts to model rm-speci c productivity shocks which f o l l o w a Markov process.
The main interpretative focus of the foregoing two formalizations is the \stylized fact", mentioned above, concerning the variability o f g r o wth rates and survival probabilities (empirically observed to be often dependent also on the size and age of rms themselves). 6 The model of Ericson and Pakes (1995) treats the same phenomena within the setting of a class of Markovperfect Nash equilibria (in principle able to account also for persistent turbulence, i . e . \ s t ylized fact (iv)", above). Firms are supposed to evolve according to their relative e ciency or \state of success", itself dependent upon exogenous drifts in competitive opportunities and endogenous (resource-expensive) stochastic changes in the`pecking-order' of both incumbents and entrants.
Although these attempts (and others in a similar spirit) to rationalize some aspects of the observed dynamics of industries ought t o b e c o n s i d e r e d w elcome developments, they do, however, display, in our view, some noticeable drawbacks, to a large extent due to the self-in icted burden of rationalizing industrial dynamics as equilibrium paths of some kind microfounded upon sophisticated forward-looking agents. All this carries serious problems of both economic plausibility and, together, of mathematical coherence.
Take the model in Jovanovic (1982) . (A similar argument applies to the model by Hopenhayn 1992.) There is a continuum of rms which are heterogeneous in that each is an independent realization of a representative r m . Their outputs { notwithstanding the fact that rms are verbally assumed to be in nitesimal { are i.i.d. nonnegative random variables. Consequently, the total output of the industry, as a sum of in nitely many i.i.d. nonnegative random variables, must be in nite with probability one at every time instant. Thus, the claim of this work of a nite deterministic equilibrium output, necessary for the model to hold, remains puzzling 7 .
5
For example, rst moves advantages do not appear among the basic determinants of industry structure in the de nitive account of the SCP paradigm, namely Scherer and Ross (1990) this applies even more so to the treatment of competition in standard textbooks on industrial organization: see, for example, Carlton and Perlo (1999). 6 Other works addressing similar issues, include Lambson (1991), Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) , and Klepper (1996) which, in quite di erent v eins, model some interaction between sunk costs and time-dependent learning also as the cause of`shakeouts' (i.e.`stylized facts (v)' above).
7
In Kaniovski (2000) one identi es the implicit route to get a nite total supply in this setting, i.e. taking weighted normalizations of individual outputs rather than simple sums. The underlying idea is germane to the attempts by e.g. Judd (1985) or Feldman and Gilles (1985) to formally validate the measurability of a total supply stemming from a continuum of independent individual outputs. So, as Judd (1985) puts it \the law of large numbers with a continuum of random variables is not inconsistent with basic mathematics". (P. 2 4 . )
The demands on individual rationality and the corresponding requirements on ex ante coordination among agents are even more stringent in Ericson and Pakes (1995) . In short, a necessary condition for the model to apply is the collective identity of expectations about both drifts in competitive opportunities and investment plans. Unfortunately, this approach d o e s n o t guarantee the optimality of individual trajectories. In its essence, the problem is as follows.
The collective dynamics used in the incumbent's optimization problem keeps a record of the number of rms occupying each feasible e ciency level. As such, it is not concerned with what happens to a rm upon exiting the industry. On the other hand, the law of motion of a rm must explicitly specify how the rm quits the industry. Ericson and Pakes (1995) states that the optimal path of the industry, a rational expectations equilibrium, obtains by aggregating the individual trajectories derived by solving the incumbent's optimization problem. However, as an aggregate of individual motions, the optimal path must specify what happens to any o n e rm quitting the industry. As discussed in much greater detail in Kaniovski (2001) , it turns out that the model does not guarantee the consistency between \optimal" individual trajectories and the industry aggregate, which should, of course, in equilibrium, sum upon the former. It is a problem rather common amongst models purportedly nested upon rational expectation agents, but it is particularly demanding in set-ups whereby a g e n ts are also allowed to leave the modeled environment. (In fact, as one shows in Kaniovski (2001) , all \dead entities" keep evolving alike living ones.)
Here, we take a quite di erent route and focus upon the properties competitive processes where no ex ante consistency is assumed among individual expectations and behaviours. Hence markets ex post select among heterogeneous agents, whose stochastic entry to the market resembles much more the messy process described in the empirical literature. 8 In turn, the selection process is itself dependent on the aggregation of individual decisions, hence closing the feedback loop between linking, microeconomic heterogeneity, the dynamic path of the industry and individual growth/survival opportunities. The methodology that we shall follow in the modeling exercise below is somewhat similar in spirit to that advocated by the \Bounds Approach" pioneered by Sutton (1998), notwithstanding rather di erent building blocks. Both perspectives share the search for \a small number of mechanisms that appear to operate in a systematic way across the general run of industries and whose] operation induces a number of bounds on the set of outcomes that we expect to observe in empirical data" (Sutton (1998), p. 5). Hence, for example, Sutton establishes the lower bound of the skewedness of size distributions simply by isolating the e ects of purely statistical independence e ects in the growth and entry process. Here, we follow a similar strategy and try to identify some generic properties of a stochastic process of entry together with a systematic mechanism of selection operating via the impact of pro t margins upon investment opportunities and ultimately survival probabilities. However, unlike Sutton we do not constrain the set of outcomes to those which ful ll some rationality criterion (i.e. entrants must cover their costs and they are rational enough in this entry decisions for this to happen), and some non-arbitrage principle (saying more or less that all pro t opportunities are exploited). On the contrary, w e shall explore the characteristics of the dynamic pro le of industries wherein these criteria may be systematically violated.
The Basic Model
Consider an industry evolving in discrete time t = 0 1 : : : . A t t i m e t = 0 there are no rms ready to manufacture, but a random number of rms are drawn which will start manufacturing However, as one argues in Kaniovski (2000) , such a use of the law of large numbers in Jovanovic (1982) turns out to be rather at odds with economics. Moreover, it appears that Jovanovic (1982) interchangingly uses two notions for the output of a rm. One { as a solution of the optimization problem of a price-taker. (Who, due to unspeci ed reason, operates with a generic inverse demand curve, rather then with a horizontal one.) The other { as a measure of the index by which the rm is marked. at t = 1 . A t time t 1 the industry consists of n t rms which a r e i n volved in manufacturing and new rms which e n ter at t and will be involved in manufacturing from t + 1 on. Uniformly for the whole industry we h a ve: m -v ariable (marginal average) costs per unit of output, m > 0, which, for simplicity, w e assume for the time being identical across rms v -price per unit of physical capital, v > 0 d -the \physical" depreciation rate, 0 < d 1.
The competitiveness of a rm represented in the industry is determined by (the inverse of) its capital per unit of output. Let us designate it by a i for the i-th rm. The variable a i takes a nite number of values A 1 < A 2 < : : : < A k k 1. A particular value is randomly assigned to a rm when it enters the industry.
The productive capacity (which is fully utilized) of the i-th rm is Q i t = K i (t)=a i , where K i (t) stands for the capital of the i-th rm at time t. The total productive capacity o f t h e industry involved in manufacturing at time t is
(We set that the sum where the lower index exceeds the upper one equals to zero.) There is a decreasing continuous inverse demand function p = h(q), mapping 0 1) i n 0 h (0)] such that h(0) < 1 and h(q) ! 0 a s q ! 1 . A s u s u a l , p stands for the price and q for the demand. Thus, the market clearing price at time t is given as h(Q t ). The gross pro t per unit of output at t is h(Q t ) ; m. Hence, the gross investment per unit of output at t reads At each time t we shall allow a random number of entrants for each level of capital per unit of output. Again, the distribution of the number of entrants does not depend upon their competitiveness (see however the extensions of the model below). It is given by an independent realization of a random variable taking the values 0 1 : : : l , w h e r e l is a positive i n teger (Pf = lg > 0). The number of entrants at time t that have t h e j-th level of capital per unit of output is given by the j-th coordinate ; t j of a k-dimensional random vector ; t . The vectors ; t are observations of ; independent i n t. E a c h coordinate of ; is an independent realization of . The initial capitals of new entrants at time t with the j-th level of capital per unit of output are given by ; t j independent realizations t j i 1 i ; t j , o f if ; t j > 0 and are equal to 0 if ; t j = 0 . Set t to be a k-dimensional vector such that
Thus, t j represents the total in ow of capital at t of rms with A j as capital per unit of output.
The random variables ; t j and s p i are independent for all possible combinations of indexes. Two remarks are in order. First, note that the random variables ; and can be given a straightforward economic interpretation in terms of technological opportunities to potential entrants, scale of entry and entry barriers. (And, indeed, the computer-simulated version of the model allows experiments with di erent distributions intuitively corresponding to empirically diverse \entry regimes"). Second, for simplicity, w e treat here the stochastic entry process as entirely exogenous { in particular entry does not depend on past or present industry pro tability. The point of this assumption is not the a rmative claim that all entry is independent of pro tability, but that some entry is (possibly more so in the vicinity of that notional equilibrium where on average rms earn zero net pro ts). Many models of rational entry under uncertainty, w ould have that feature, too. The principal qualitative result of our analysis are not a ected by the addition o f a l a yer of pro t-dependent e n try, though the quantitative results certainly are. Moreover, one can easily endogenize the entry process, and in fact in the next section we shall describe a modi cation of the model where the distribution of the numb e r o f e n trants depends on the current pro t margins.
To complete the description of this competitive e n vironment w e need some death mechanism.
A rm is dead at time t and does not participate in the production process from t + 1 o n ward if its capital at t is less than b, 2 (0 1]. A setup without mortality can be thought of as a limit case of this threshold when = 0 .
Given this setting, all random elements are de ned on a probability space f F P g.
Generalizations of the Model
Let us consider some generalizations of the basic model presented above, which can be essentially studied by the same analytic means, without a ecting the major qualitative conclusions. 1. On purpose, in the foregoing basic setting we h a ve k ept the behavioral assumptions to a minimum. In that vein, we h a ve ruled out also any feedback from pro tability t o i n vestment rules. However the qualitative properties of the model would not be a ected if one allowed the rate of investment to fall when the price gets close to variable costs per unit of output. In that case one would just set gross investment per unit of output at t as 2. The death levels may be di erent for rms with di erent e ciencies, say i for all rms with A i as capital per unit of output. At the same time the death criterion could be dependent on the total productive capacity at time t. That is, the i-th rm is dead at time t and does not participate in the evolution of the market from t on if its productive capacity Q i t at t is less than Q t , where 2 (0 1) is some threshold value.
3. One can allow also variable costs to vary across rms. Assume that there are n > 1 possible levels of variable costs per unit of output m j j = 1 2 : : : n . A l l o wing as above f o r multiple entrants, one may postulate that at time t 0 the number of newcoming rms which have A i as output/capital ratio and m j as variable costs is given by ; t n(i;1)+j the n(i ;1)+j-th coordinate of ; t . Here ; t t 0, are independent realizations of a n k dimensional vector ; whose coordinates are independent realizations of the random variable de ned in section 3. Initial capital endowments of these rms are given by ; n(i;1)+j independent realizations of the random variable . Moreover, these initial physical capitals for di erent time instants are independent and they do not depend either upon the number of newcoming rms.
4. Initial capitals of newcoming rms may be speci c for a class of rms with a given capital/output ratio and given variable costs. Thus, instead of a single random variable , w e may consider a collection of them, i j 1 i k 1 j n. (Each of these variables is assumed to have a bounded support.) Similarly, the numb e r o f e n trants can be speci c for a class of rms with given capital/output ratio and variable costs.
5. One can make the distribution of the number of newcomers path dependent. In particular, it may depend upon how close are the current price and the marginal costs of the rm which is deciding whether to enter or not. In fact, let j ( ) be a decreasing function mapping 0 1) With this speci cation, j (0) = 1 implies that, when production is not pro table for rms with variable costs m j , they will not enter the industry. Alternatively, j (0) < 1 means that, even when production is not pro table for them, some rms whose costs are m j will be entering the industry. T h us, by assigning di erent v alues to j (0), one can comply either with the \rational" assumption of no entry when the pro t is nonpositive, or with a more realistic and empirically founded view that rms may w ell keep entering even though the instantaneous pro tability i s not positive.
In the following we shall study the long run behavior of the simplest variant of this industry, beginning with a formal description of its evolution. Conceptually, V j 1 is the total in ow of productive capacity o f r m s h a ving A j as capital per unit of output during the rst time period. Q 1 stands for the total productive capacity i n volved in manufacturing during the rst time period. Not all of the rms which m a n ufactured during the rst production cycle remain in the industry during the second time period. Those that have shrunk below the minimum threshold have t o l e a ve. Denote by E j In the same way w e g e t Q A j t+1 = Q 
and E t stands for the total out ow of productive capacity a t t i m e t due to mortality,
The random process given by (1) and (2) is not as such a Markov process. (However, it turns out to be one, if there is no death rule, and, hence, rms may shrink inde nitely but do not exit the industry.)
Note also that this setting does not account for the fate of any individual rm. Let us consider an alternative, explicitly microfounded, representation.
Since only the entry process of the model is stochastic, the state of the industry at any time t is determined given the detailed history of entry and output through t ; 1 and the stochastic events of t. F urther, the output history of the system to any t can be computed recursively on the basis of prior output history and current stochastic entry. Although only nitely many rm output levels are relevant u p t o a n y particular t, a full realization of the process involves an in nite number of rm histories. At a n y time, the part of the output history that has not happened yet is represented by an in nite list of zeroes zeroes may also appear in the rm-speci c output history because the corresponding rm has died. It is convenient for the representation to make r o o m f o r e v ery possible rm that could come into being this means that zeroes also appear in the output history of a given time because less than the maximum possible number (l) o f r m s m a y h a ve e n tered in some previous periods.
With this picture in mind, let us introduce an in nite dimensional space R 1 of vectors with denumerably many coordinates. It is instructive to split the evolution of the industry in the dynamics of age cohorts. (This is not necessary. F ormally, the story remains the same regardless of whether one talks about cohorts or not. However, conceptually, the approach becomes much more transparent b y using the language of cohorts.) By a cohort one means all rms that enter the industry at the same period. Then R 1 splits in in nitely many identical blocks, kldimensional real vector spaces R kl i , corresponding to age cohorts. (Remember, k denotes the total number of possible levels of capital/output ratios, while l stands for the maximum number of entrants for each of these levels. Consequently, one may observe u p t o kl rms in an age cohort.) Alternatively one may s a y that R 1 is the Cartesian product of R kl i i 1. In formal terms,
Thus, for every q 2 R 1 q = 1 i=1 q i with q i 2 R kl i . That is, the in nite output history q (which is the history of productive capacities as well, because rms fully utilize them) may be regarded as partitioned into vectors q i of dimension kl, e a c h of which m a y be be thought of as output levels (productive capacities) of a speci c age cohort, i. (Here, as noted above, we \make room" in the notation for the outputs of rms that may not exist in a particular realization because less than the maximum possible number of entrants appeared in that cohort.) The notational convention adopted is that rms are numb e r e d w i t h i n t ypes and within cohorts. Thus, for example, the rms of the third cohort, that is, those that have produced twice, are numbered from 2kl+1t o3 kl. In a realization of the process, the deterministic part of the output change from period to period can be represented as follows.
As a rst step in characterizing the evolution of the industry in terms of age cohorts, we productive capacities of rms involved, 1 j k 1 p l, and i 1. That is, i denotes the age of a cohort, j is the number of the level of capital costs, A j , speci c to the rm, and p is the order number assigned to this rm in the pool of all alive e n tities in the i-th age cohort whose capital/output ration is A j . W e restrict ourselves to vectors q with nonnegative coordinates and set I(1) = 0 for the case when the iterated sum involved in the above expression is in nite. Moreover, L i Consider at time (age) i 1 an alive rm having A j as capital per unit of output. Let its productive capacity b e q i (j;1)l+p > 0 (since it is alive). The question is whether it will be participating in the next production cycle or not. According to our mortality rule, it depends upon whether its capital at the end of the current production period is not less than or falls below the death threshold, b. Hence, the rm survives and continues its production if this expression for capital is not less than b. Otherwise, the rm dies and never returns to business.
We set D( ) for the deterministic mapping R 1 in R 1 characterizing the deterministic evo- 
Since Y t are independent i n t, this expression de nes a Markov process on R 1 . Also, since the deterministic operator D( ) a s w ell as the distribution of Y t do not depend on time, the process is homogeneous in time. Conceptually this phase space is formed by productive capacities of all rms which s t a y alive. More precisely, i f q i (j;1)l+p (t) > 0 for some p = 1 2 : : : land t > i 1, then a rm with A j as capital per unit of output which came to the industry at t ; i has been alive u n til t, that is, has manufactured i ; 1 times, and continue to manufacture during the t-th time period.
Having outlined the speci c features of this process of industrial change, let us proceed to its analysis.
Entry, Mortality and Long Run Balance Relations
Start from the statement that, for any j in a nite time with probability one there will be born at least one rm with A j as capital per unit of output. Lemma 1. For each j = 1 2 : : : kin a nite random time j with probability one there appears a rm with A j as capital per unit of output. (Here we t o o k i n to account that I(x) < I (0) for all x > 0.) WhenQ < Q this inequality implies that Q t < Q for t 1. Otherwise, whenQ Q, it means that Q t <Q for t 1. (Indeed, upon upcrossing the level Q, this sequence is bounded byQ. But at Q and above this level, it is a decreasing sequence.) In sum, one may conclude that there is a nite deterministic upper bound Q of Q t t 1: Moreover, Q < max( Q Q ):
The lemma is proved. Let us now show that, if there is a death threshold, then none of the rms can survive f o r in nitely long time. The argument g i v en below is instructive demonstrating how the selection mechanism in question works. Each r m e n ters with a physical capital which cannot be below b. If it dies, at the moment when this happens its capital must be less than b. That is, a rm living a nite time must shrink during its life at least 1= times. The intuitive proof (by c o n tradiction) of the theorem starts by the observation that at least some rms, including some of the most e cient ones do die. Consequently, taking into account that the most e cient r m s h a ve the highest investment rate, a notional rm that would live in nitely long would shrink at least 1= times during the life time of a most e cient one, if the latter dies in a nite time. Hence, to prove that no rm can live in nitely long, it is enough to show that the capital of every alive rm is bounded from above b y a constant and that there is a long enough (depending upon the constant) or, better, an in nite chain of the most e cient rms coming and dying one after another.
The capital of an alive rm is bounded from above b y the total physical capital of the industry which in turn is bounded with certainty b y Lemma 2. Moreover, the capital of an alive rm is bounded from below b y the death threshold, b. Hence, the total number of alive rms is bounded from above with certainty b y Q A k = b. Consequently, starting from a nite random time every newcoming rm dies in a nite time. Since p 0 = 0, at least one the most e cient rm comes every time instant. Thus, starting from , there is an in nite chain of the most e cient rms coming and dying one just after another. This chain will push below the death threshold the physical capital of any candidate for living in nitely long.
The theorem is proved.
From (1) A ;1 j uctuate through time in such a w ay that on average positive deviations of these values from zero are compensated by their negative deviations.
However, the results given by Lemma 3 do not say a n ything about the limit behavior of time averages of Q A j t or Q t . T o study this issue, let us turn to the ergodic properties of process (3).
Ergodic Properties of the Industry
Is there any role for \history" in determining the long-run fate of our admittedly very simple industry? In order to answer the question, let us check its possible ergodic properties.
De ne B 1 the minimal -eld in R 1 generated by sets of the following form
where A j denotes a set from the -eld of Borel sets B kl j in R kl j . F or every such set A one step transition probability of process (3) 
Here Y stands for the kl-dimensional vector whose coordinates coincide with rst kl coordinates of a generic vector Y having the same distribution as Y t t 0. Also, D(q)2 1 i=2 A i is an indicator function. As explained above, it takes on value 1 or 0 depending whether D(q) 2 1 i=2 A i or D(q) 6 2 1 i=2 A i . The total productive capacity is bounded with certainty. Consequently, process (3) belongs with probability o n e t o L = n q 2 R 1 :
To study the ergodic properties of process (3), we need the following condition, due to Doeblin (see Doob (1953), p. 192) : there is a nite positive measure ( ) with (L) > 0 a n d a n umber 2 (0 1) such that for all q 2 L p 1 (q A ) 1 ; if (A) : For a set A as in (11) 
de nes for each q 2 L a stationary absolute distribution. Here p t (x ) stands for the transition probability i n t steps, that is, p t (q A ) = Z L p t;1 (y A )dp 1 (q y) t 2:
The stationary distribution (q ) turns out to be the same, that is $ ( ), for all q belonging to the same ergodic set $ (Doob (1953) , p. 210). Since (L) = 1 a n d = 1 =2, there can be at most two ergodic sets. (See Doob (1953) , p. 207.) Because p 1 (x $) = 1 f o r a n y x 2 $, it follows that the component o f $ belonging to R kl 1 must contain the support of Y . A s a n y ergodic set is unique up to a subset whose measure is zero, we conclude that there is a single ergodic set. Consequently, the corresponding measure, ( ) is unique as well. It has the following generic property
In general, it is not possible to nd from this relation an explicit expression for ( ). But, due to the speci c structure of the operator D( ) it allows to conclude that the distribution ( ) nests in a nite dimensional space when > 0.
Lemma 4. If > 0, then there i s a n i t e N < Q A k = b such that, for every A as in (11), (A) = 0 if A i 6 = f0 i g for some i > N . In other words, the support of ( ) belongs to N i=1 R kl i . Here 0 i denotes the zero v e ctor of R kl i .
Proof. Let q be a vector whose distribution is ( ). That is Pfq 2 Ag = (A) for every A as in (11). Equations (3) and (14) imply that the vectors D(q ) + Y and q have the same distribution. This observation allows to make t wo conclusions concerning q .
First, with certainty, nonzero coordinates of q may not fall below bA ;1 k . Indeed, the rst k of them do not fall below bA ;1 1 as initial productive capacities of rms whose capital ratio equals A 1 . In general, the coordinates whose numbers are from (j ;1)l to jldo not fall below bA ;1 j . A s A ;1 j > A ;1 k for j 6 = k, w e conclude that the rst kl nonzero coordinates of q do not fall below bA ;1 k : The rest do not fall below bA ;1 k . Again, the productive capacity o f a m a n ufacturing rm whose capital ratio is A j is bounded from below b y bA ;1 j . A s A ;1 j > A ;1 k for j 6 = k, w e s e e that bA ;1 j > bA ;1 k . Second, with certainty, The lemma is proved.
If there are distinct subsequent cyclically moving subsets, C i , i 1 of the ergodic set in question, then p 1 (q C i+1 ) = 1 f o r e v ery q 2 C i : (See Doob (1953) , p. 210.) Consequently, t h e component o f C i+1 belonging to R kl 1 must contain a copy of the support of Y . In other words, C i and C i+1 coincide up to a subset whose measure is zero. In sum, the Markov process in question does not have cyclically moving subsets. Since ( ) does not have cyclically moving subsets, drawing from Case (f) in Doob (1953), p. 214, we conclude that the limit in (13) exists as an ordinary (rather than Ces aro) limit. That is, taking into account that the stationary distribution is unique, lim t!1 p t (q A ) = (A) for each q 2 L: Let ( ) be a function measurable with respect to B 1 and integrable with respect to ( ). By the strong law of large numbers (see Doob (1953) , p. 220), as n ! 1
with probability one. This result shows that all sensible time averages of process (3) converge with probability one to deterministic limits. Thus, in particular, the following statement holds.
Theorem 2. With probability one
and, if > 0,
as n ! 1 . Here j = 1 2 : : : k . B y j (t) we denote the number of rms having A j as capital per unit of output which are manufacturing at time t.
Proof. The sums involved in (15) { (17) are measurable with respect to B 1 nonnegative functions. Indeed, while for (15) and (17) this is straightforward, concerning (16) we h a ve t o take i n to account that I( ) is a continuous function by h ypothesis. By de nition of L, the sum involved in (15) is uniformly bounded from above b y Q . T aking into account the continuity o f I( ), we get that the expression in the right hand side of (16) I(x) < 1:
Note that the minimal productive capacity of a rm with A j as capital per unit of output which is manufacturing is bA ;1 j . Since the total productive capacity o f s u c h rms does not exceed Q for any time instant, we conclude that the iterated sum in (17) is bounded from above b y A j Q = b. T h us, the functions involved in the right hand sides of (15) { (17) are measurable and uniformly bounded. Consequently, they are integrable with respect to ( ). Applying the strong law o f l a r g e n umbers quoted above, we obtain the statement of the theorem. The theorem is proved.
Relations ( represents the gross total pro t of all rms having A j as capital per unit of output at time t, the second relation says that the time average of this value converges to a deterministic limit.
The third relation means that the average number of rms with A j as capital per unit of output that are in business converges to a deterministic limit as well.
Remark. Arguing as above, we can derive expressions for the limits of the time averages of market shares of all rms whose capital ratio is A j .
From (9), (15) and (16) we get the following result.
Corollary. With probability one 1 n n X t=0 E j t j = 1 2 : : : k converge as n ! 1 and the corresponding limits, e j , a r e deterministic satisfying the following relations e j = aA ;1 j ; dq j + v r j A ;1 j j = 1 2 : : : k where q j and r j denote the values in the right hand sides of (15) and (16).
Thus, this corollary gives expressions for the limit average total out ows of productive c apacities of rms via the other ergodic characteristics of the industry and the parameters of the model.
The foregoing properties shed light on the possible path-dependence of the dynamics. Indeed, Doeblin's condition implies that events occuring at t and t + n are getting more and more independent a s n ! 1 . This ergodic property means as such l a c k of path-dependence. Moreover, the limits for the time averages for productive capacities, out ows of the latters, numbers of rms in business, etc. do not depend on the initial state. (A caveat is however in order: such ergodicity properties are likely to crucially depend on the lack of endogenous technical progress in our \baseline model" and are likely to be lost whenever one allows for cumulative forms of learning: see also the remarks in Winter et al. (2000) .)
In order to explore some more detailed properties of the dynamics of industry structure, let us turn to numerical simulations of the model.
Some Results of Computer Simulations
As an illustration of some qualitative properties, let us consider on a set of computer simulations of the model which w e performed 9 . (Note that we h a ve tried several runs, under di erent parametrizations and the properties discussed below appear to generally apply: more rigorous test for robustness are forthcoming.) The runs presented below use the following parametriza- Figure 1 shows the dynamic of the price for 1 t 50: it tends stabilize rather quickly around its long term average level, which indeed is below that value at which e v erybody shrinks. (Note that this is a property of the price a v e r age, while the actual price keeps uctuating around this level.)
Underlying that apparent stability of aggregate supply, one observes however a more messy micro structure with a fringe of productive capacity provided by the least e cient rms (Figure 2) , which k eep entering and quickly die. Note also that while the total capacity stabilizes 9
The simulation used a program from the Laboratory for Simulation Development (LSD), a package providing a user-friendly environment for implementation of simulation models, developed by M . V alente (see Valente (1997) ) at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and subsequently at Alborg university. I t i s publicly available via Internet, at http : ==www:business:auc:dk=~mv=Lsd=lsd:html. rather fast, this is not so for the total number of rms (cf. Figure 3) . That is to say, for a rather long \transitional dynamic" the \carrying capacity" of the market is not saturated and the relative aggregate stability of supply and price is supported by a net in ow o f r m s . I n a s e n s e , during the transitional dynamic, market selection operates less e ectively allowing relatively long survival time also for less e cient rms and persistent \early mover advantages". Note also what looks like a \shakeout" at some point in the history of the industry (cf. Figure 3) corresponding to the time when highest productivity rms start getting a hold on the market: the number of rms dramatically falls (purely due to an increase in the mortality rates) and non-best practice rms are relegated thereafter to a rather marginal, but persistent fringe of the industry. Skewed size distributions appear from early on and remain thereafter (Figure 4 ), notwithstanding the very simpli ed assumptions of our model (including the absence of learning by incumbents) 10 . Note also that despite size as such does not provide any speci c advantage, one 10 We are facing here a phenomenon similar to the well known Pareto law (see, for example, Ijiri and Simon (1974) ), which in one of its formulations states that for a set of rms ranked according to their size, the size s and the rank r of a rm are related as sr = A, w h e r e and A are positive constants. Figure 5: The life time distribution of 98% of rms dead before t = 500 (for sake of visual clarity, the gure does not include 2% of rms surviving the longest time, i.e. around 100 periods).
observes the early emergence of one or few (transient) market leaders (Figure 4 ). When both production capacity and numb e r o f r m s a p p r o a c h their stationary regimes, the competitive pressure prevents all rms (including the most e cient ones) from expanding inde nitely. Relatedly, the ensuing life time distribution, that is the number of production cycles rms perform before dying (cf. Figure 5 ), assures that even the most e cient rms are bound to disappear in the long term. Indeed, the picture is very similar to the Marshallian view of the \forest", mentioned earlier, with a persistent turnover of trees (with, of course, the marginal fringe having the highest turnover rates). Note also that the foregoing qualitative properties hold across di erent parametrizations of the model, although long-term averages and the length of the \transitional dynamics" depend of course on the parametrization itself.
Conclusions
In this paper we h a ve d e v eloped a formal analytical apparatus able to treat the dynamics of industrial evolution and derive some generic properties of the underlying competition process. The continuing entry ow produces a continuing turnover in the rm population of the sort observed in real data. The size distribution of rms emerges as a derivative consequence of the combination of heterogeneity and turnover. Although \snapshots" of the distribution at di erent points in time might be similar (after the industry has approached its long term dynamic path), the rms occupying particular places in the distribution are generally di erent. This does not only apply to the lower end of the distribution, but to the whole universe of rms: in fact, we proved, under quite general conditions, that all rms are bound to die in a nite random time with probability one.
Moreover, the long-run proportions of rms of di erent e ciency levels re ect the interplay of selection forces and entry rates { indeed, in a fashion roughly analogous to the analysis of gene frequencies provided by the Hardy { Weinberg laws of population biology 11 . The view of the outcomes of the competition process, in a sense, is a formal vindication of the intuition of classical economists that conditions of entry and (heterogeneous) techniques of production determine some sort of \centers of gravity" around which actual prices, quantities and pro tabilities persistently uctuate. In fact, on the ground of the foregoing model, one is able to establish the limit properties of those time averages.
As mentioned earlier, the model is suitable to several extensions. An obvious one is the account of an endogenous process of arrival of new techniques and, hence, new productivity levels (see Winter et al. (2000) ). However, even in its \baseline" version presented here the model is able to account, together, for the \stylized facts" recalled at the beginning concerning turbulence, \life cycle" properties of industry evolution, skewed size distributions and persistent uctuation in output and prices. The fundamental drivers of the process generating those phenomena are shown to rest upon an ever-lasting in ow of technologically heterogeneous rms and market selection.
Finally, note also that hardly any assumption of the foregoing formal apparatus binds its applications to the domain of industrial dynamics. On the contrary, even as it stands, i t a ppears particularly suitable to a large ensemble of dynamic processes { including several of those formalized by e v olutionary game theories. Even when assuming that the domain of notational exploration is nite and given from the start, the explicit account of random occurrences in heterogeneous populations subject to systematic selection pressures yields quite rich structures of the emerging evolutionary processes.
11
The Hardy { Weinberg laws provide a quantitative statement of the fact that \deleterious" genes are continuously eliminated from the population by natural selection forces, but are replenished by m utation (see Wilson and Bossert (1971) ).
This contradicts (a2). Hence, it is not possible that there is a rm surviving in nitely long with positive probability. If = 1 , w e notice that, since is not deterministic, there is > 0 s u c h that Pf b+ g > 0.
By an argument similar to the one given in the proof of Lemma 1, we conclude that with probability one there is a sequence of random time instants t 0 k k 1, such that at least one of the most e cient rms born at t 0 k has initial capital exceeding b + . Then for t k we have that the capital of the in nitely long living rm at least does not grow (for the previous argument), but it shrinks at least 1 + =btimes during the life time of every new most e cient entrant whose initial capital is equal or greater than b + . Since with probability one there are in nitely many of the latter rms, this again contradicts the assumption that such rm can live forever. Now let us turn to the case when p 0 > 0. Under the life cycle of a rm (living a nite time)
we understand its entering the market, performing some number of production cycles, and its exiting the market.
First let < 1. Set M for the smallest natural number such that Q A k M;1 < b . W h e n at least M subsequent life cycles of the most e cient rms take place, the physical capital any alive rm in the industry is pushed below the death threshold, b. Consequently, if such a c hain of life cycles occurs in a nite time with probability one, there may not be in the industry rms living in nitely long with positive probability. Let us implement this idea.
The physical capital of any a l i v e rm is bounded from above b y the total capital of the industry. By Lemma 2, the latter is smaller than Q A k with certainty. Shrinking at least ;1 times during a single life cycle of a most e cient rm, after M such subsequent cycles, this individual physical capital will fall below Q A k M < b . T h us, no rm in the industry may survive M or more subsequent life cycles of most e cient rms. Set S for the smallest natural number such that S b Q A k . As the minimal capital size of an alive rm is b, a t a n y g i v en time instant, the industry may n o t h a ve S or more alive rms.
Consequently, if during a time period, at every time instant at least one rm enters the industry, every S time instants at least one rm has to exit.
Let T be the event that during each o f SM subsequent time instants at least one most e cient rm enters the industry. Then T implies at least M subsequent life cycles of most e cient rms. Indeed, during each o f SM subsequent time instants at least one of them comes to the market and, thus, every S time instants at least one of them has to leave. Such life cycles are subsequent because at each time instant out of those SM at least one most e cient rm enters.
Since the entry decisions are independent across rms, the probability o f T is P 0 = ( 1 ; p 0 ) SM > 0. Arguing like in the proof of Lemma 1, we conclude that T occurs in a nite time with with probability one. This accomplishes the argument for the case when p 0 > 0 a n d < 1. Considering life cycles of the most e cient rms whose initial capitals do not fall below b + for some > 0 s u c h t h a t Pf b + g > 0 we can adjust the argument g i v en above f o r t h e situation when = 1 .
